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Justice and the Administrative State:
The FDIC and the Superior Bank Failure
ChristianA. Johnson*
As society becomes more complicated and increasingly interrelated,
the administrative state is forced to take a more active role to ensure
For instance,
justice in an environment of competing interests.
can prove
failure
bank
a
promoting justice or equitable response during
Corporation
particularly difficult for the Federal Deposit Insurance
("FDIC") due to its assumption of multiple roles with respect to banks
and other financial institutions. This article discusses the difficulties of
promoting justice by assessing the FDIC's actions in resolving the
insolvency of Superior Bank, FSB ("Superior"), a billion-dollar Illinois
savings bank that failed in 2001-a failure that will end up costing the
FDIC's insurance fund hundreds of millions of dollars.
The FDIC, a government agency, is responsible not only for the
regulation and oversight of insured financial institutions, but also for
1 In closing and
their closure and liquidation in times of insolvency.
liquidating a financial institution, the FDIC acts in a "corporate
capacity" in administrating and managing the Savings Association
2
Insurance Fund ("Insurance Fund"). The Insurance Fund is used to
pay-off insured deposits held in savings and loans, savings banks, or
3
similar types of thrifts that have "failed.", In its resolution of the
Superior insolvency, the FDIC entered into a highly unusual partnership
with Superior's high-profile stockholders after Superior's closure, thus
illustrating the issues of justice and fairness that result from the conflicts
of interest arising from the FDIC's differing roles.
Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author can be
*
reached at cjohns6@luc.edu.
1. See FDIC: FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, INSURING AMERICA'S FUTURE,

at www.fdic.gov (last visited Jan. 4, 2005) (noting that the FDIC is "[a]n independent agency
created by Congress in 1933 ... [to] insure" deposits and help "maintain stable and sound
banking system").
2. The FDIC also manages a similar fund for commercial banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)(A)
(2000).
3. The FDIC will close a financial institution such as a thrift or a bank when the institution is
either insolvent or such insolvency is imminent. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2000).
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At its pinnacle, Superior, a federal savings bank headquartered in
Hinsdale, Illinois, was one of the most aggressive financial institutions
in the United States and held over two billion dollars in assets.
Controlled by a partnership of the Pritzker family (of Hyatt Hotel
4

fame) and the Dworman family (known for aggressive real estate
development), Superior failed in 2001. The FDIC estimated that the
failure would ultimately cost over $500 million in payments to insured
5
depositors.

The Superior failure provides rare insight into how an administrative

agency such as the FDIC metes out justice.

In its analysis of the

regulation and closure of Superior by the Office of Thrift Supervision

and the FDIC, the government prepared three highly critical reports

worthy of examination.
Moreover, there was significant litigation
following the liquidation in which the FDIC in its corporate capacity
brought an action for fraud, negligence, and malpractice against Ernst &
Young, Superior's auditor. 7

Although the suit was unsuccessful,

analysis of the action provides additional background and insight

regarding the FDIC's resolution of Superior's insolvency.

On its most basic level, ensuring justice is generally thought of as

being fair or right under a given set of circumstances.
failure raised two distinct questions regarding

The Superior
the FDIC's

administration of justice in its resolution of Superior's insolvency: (1)

did the FDIC act unjustly or unfairly to other depositors and creditors
when it gave preferential treatment to its wealthy stockholders; and (2)

did the FDIC abuse its rights in pursuit of auditor Ernst & Young in its
corporate capacity by rejecting contractual protections that would have
4. See Shane Tritsch, Tremors in the Empire, CHI. MAG., Dec. 2002, available
at
http://www.chicagomag.com/stories/1202pritzker.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2005) (providing
a
detailed discussion of the Pritzker family).
5. Complaint of Plaintiff at 116, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 256 F. Supp.
2d
798 (N.D. I11.2003) (No. 02 C 7914), availableat 2003 WL 22717757.
6. Analysis of the Failureof SuperiorBank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois: Before the Senate
Comm.
On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (2002) (statement of Thomas J. McCool,
Managing Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment), available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02419t.pdf
[hereinafter GAO Report]; OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AUDIT REP. No. 02-005, ISSUES RELATED
TO
THE FAILURE OF SUPERIOR BANK, FSB, HINSDALE, ILL. (2002), available
at
http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports02/02-005.pdf [hereinafter FDIC REPORT]; OFFICE OF
THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, No. OIG-02-040, MATERIAL
LOSS
REVIEW OF SUPERIOR BANK, FSB (2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/inspectorgeneral/audit-reports/2002/oigO204o.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT].
7. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 374 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2004), modifying
& aff'g
256 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that the FDIC, in its corporate capacity, brought
suit
against Ernst & Young for fraud, negligence, and malpractice in its role as auditor of
Superior
Bank).
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shielded the auditors from the FDIC in its role as receiver?
The answers to these questions should not hinge on the size of the
monetary settlement or the amount of damages that the FDIC may have
8
collected in its litigation with Ernst & Young. In fact, if the size of a
recovery (via settlement or judgment) becomes the principal
consideration in dictating the actions of an administrative agency, any
notion of justice or fairness is discarded. Instead, they are replaced by
agency interpretation of arcane statutory and regulatory provisions,
potentially skewed in its favor if an agency determines that it will
maximize its power and potential monetary recovery.
By agreeing to the settlement among Superior's shareholders and
suing Ernst & Young in its corporate capacity (as opposed to suing as
the receiver of Superior), the FDIC lost sight of what it should have
done, versus what it could and what it did do. The first part of this
article will discuss the history of the Superior Bank failure and the
actions of the FDIC in its closure. This part will focus in particular on
the settlement agreement arranged by the FDIC with Superior's primary
owners ("Pritzker Settlement"), as well as the subsequent litigation
against Ernst & Young. The second part will discuss the regulatory
framework created by Congress for the FDIC in resolving the failure of
a financial institution. It will then address its impact on Superior, its
creditors, and Ernst & Young, with particular respect to the Pritzker
Settlement and subsequent litigation. In synthesis, the article concludes
that agencies must not lose sight of what they should do when hundreds
of millions of dollars are at stake.
THE SUPERIOR BANK FAILURE

The Superior Bank failure was one of the largest bank failures since
the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s. The first
section of this part will discuss Superior's business model and its
eventual catastrophic failure. The second section will discuss the
various roles that the FDIC balanced as it dealt with the complex
failure. Finally, the last section will discuss the highly unusual and
unique settlement that the FDIC reached with Superior's shareholders
and the FDIC's eventual litigation with Superior's auditors, Ernst &
Young.
8. In fact, Ernst & Young did finally settle with the FDIC on December 24, 2004, for a grand
total of $125 million. Thus, the Pritzker's take, accounting for their negotiated twenty-five
Pritzkers to Get Milliofis
percent interest in the settlement, will be around thirty million 2dollars.
2 28
00
/ap1730436.html (last
/
4/1
www.forbes.com/associatedpress/feeds/ap/
at
Settlement,
in
visited January 25, 2005).
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A. Overview
The Pritzker and Dworman families purchased Superior (formerly
known as Lyons Bank) from the FDIC in 1989 for forty-two million
dollars. 9 In 1994, Superior began using a risky strategy of lending to
high-risk customers, making sub-prime mortgage and automobile loans
at high interest rates. Superior then sold these loans in the form of large
investment pools to outside investors in a process referred to as
securitization. Superior would then use the proceeds from these sales to
issue additional loans. Superior booked a profit on these sales and also
earned large amounts of fees from these transactions. 1 0
Superior was regulated and examined by the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"), its primary federal regulator. The FDIC, in
addition to guaranteeing the federally insured deposits held by Superior,
was the secondary federal regulator. More importantly, the FDIC later
became the banking regulator responsible for handling the insolvency of
Superior and its eventual liquidation.
Superior engaged in its high-risk lending strategy for five years
before the OTS and FDIC realized that Superior had suffered losses on
its lending and securitization activities and buried them in its balance
sheets throughout this period. To its credit, the OTS understood from
the beginning that Superior's strategy was risky. However, it naively
relied upon the expertise of Superior's managers and their
representations that any serious problems that developed would be
handled with additional capital directly from the Pritzkers and
Dwormans.
The OTS finally recognized the extent of Superior's financial
problems in 1999 and proceeded to take regulatory action. In 2000 and
early 2001, the OTS, the FDIC, and Ernst & Young agreed that
Superior's accounting for its lending and securitization practices was
suspect and had resulted in write-offs of over a hundred million dollars.
With the owners unwilling to deposit additional funds, the OTS and
FDIC placed Superior into receivership in the spring of 2001.11
9. See TREASURY REPORT, supranote 6, at 48-54 (noting the chronology of significant events
and actions taken before and after the failure of Superior Bank); see also GAO Report, supra
note
6, at 25-27 (summarizing key events associated with the failure of Superior Bank).
10. For a general discussion of the Superior Bank business strategy of subprime lending and
securitization, see FDIC REPORT, supra note 6, at 14-20; Christian Johnson, The Failure
of
SuperiorBank, FSB: Regulatory Lessons Learned,BANKING L. J., Jan. 2004, at 47; GAO Report,
supra note 6, at 4-8; TREASURY REPORT, supranote 6, at 8-16.
11. Melissa Allison & William Nelkirk, Bank Closes as Pritzkers Back Out of Bailout Plan,
CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2001, at Ni (reporting on the failure of Superior Bank, resulting in estimated
total losses to the FDIC of $500 million).
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Unfortunately, approximately 1,400 uninsured depositors also suffered
losses totaling approximately forty million dollars.
B. The Role of the FDIC
It is important to understand the capacity in which the FDIC acted
with respect to Superior throughout its liquidation and during the
accompanying litigation. First, the FDIC acted as the secondary federal
regulator for Superior's operations. Second, the FDIC acted as the
receiver of Superior upon its failure, much like a bankruptcy trustee. As
the receiver, the FDIC administered Superior's estate, gathered and
liquidated its assets, and paid creditors, as well as any stockholders,
with the remaining assets. Third, the FDIC acted in a corporate
capacity, managing, administering, and finally disbursing insurance
After paying the insured
funds to Superior's insured depositors.
had the same priority as
Superior)
of
depositors, the FDIC (as a creditor
the other uninsured depositors with respect to any recoveries from the
liquidation of Superior's assets. The FDIC, in its corporate capacity,
of the 14failed
also pursued claims against the officers and stockholders
13 in this capacity, it negotiated the Pritzker settlement.
institution;
As the FDIC considered its options regarding Superior's failure, one
course of action was to recover damages from Superior's managers and
stockholders for their role in the bank's failure and to consider
imposition of criminal penalties. The government reports issued in the
aftermath of Superior's closing suggest several possible justifications
for this action. The FDIC could have argued, at best, that Superior's
management and board of directors were negligent and "asleep at the
wheel." At worst, and depending upon the results of its investigation,
the FDIC could have pursued the harsher remedies of criminal or
racketeering prosecution of Superior's upper echelon and its
In fact, the uninsured depositors sued Superior's
shareholders.
managers and directors under just such a theory (although the suit was
recently dismissed). 15 Thus, the FDIC would have pursued such
avenues in its capacity as the receiver of Superior under normal
the rights of a
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (2000) (giving the FDIC subrogation interest in all
bank it takes over).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (2000) (stating that directors and officers can be held personally
of
"liable for monetary damages in any civil action, by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction
the Corporation, which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for the benefit of the Corporation"
acting as a conservator or a receiver).
major
14. See infra Part II.C (discussing the settlement agreement between the FDIC and the
owners of Superior Bank).
CHRON., Sept. 29, 2004,
15. Judge Dismisses Superior Bank Lawsuit, KANE2 COUNTY
2
availableat http://www.kcchronicle.com/BusinessSection/ 855 1254701870.
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circumstances.
Although the Pritzker and Dworman families served as inviting
targets given their deep pockets, they, along with the FDIC, had strong
motivation to settle the matter. The FDIC was dreading years of
expensive and contentious litigation against the Pritzkers and
Dwormans with the strong possibility of negligible pay-off. The
Pritzkers and Dwormans were wary of public scandal and the bad
publicity that would accompany such a protracted fight.
C. The Settlement Agreement
The Pritzkers, acting on behalf of both families, entered into a
settlement agreement with the FDIC with respect to the families' roles
in the failure of Superior. In the agreement, the FDIC released the
families, directors, and key employees from any and all possible
damages, lawsuits, controversies, causes of action, and any other
potential claims relating to the Superior failure. 16 The agreement
expressly required no admission of guilt and required confidentiality
17
from all parties involved.
In exchange, the Pritzkers agreed to make an immediate payment of
$100 million and future payments in aggregate of $360 million over the
next fourteen years, with no interest. 18 The FDIC, in its press release,
noted this as the largest payment ever collected by the FDIC from the
shareholders of a failed financial institution. 19 Although the gross
payment was quite large, the total payments discounted to present value
were only equivalent to $300 million.
The most extraordinary part, however, was the requirement that the
FDIC share any potential recovery in the Ernst & Young litigation with
the Pritzkers and Dwormans. Specifically, the FDIC was required to
pay the families twenty-five percent of any of its recovery from Ernst &
Young related to Superior's accounting work. 20 Additionally, the
Pritzkers and Dwormans were entitled to a share of any civil monetary
penalties collected by the FDIC from Ernst & Young. The FDIC signed
16. See Press Release, FDIC, OTS Announce Agreement With Holding Companies
of
Superior Bank (Dec. 10, 2001), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2001/
pr9001.html (providing a link to the settlement agreement).
17. "Under the terms of the agreement, the Superior holding companies and their owners
(the
Pritzker and Dworman interests) admit no liability and agree to pay the FDIC $460
million and
other consideration." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. ("The parties also agreed to share in recoveries from certain litigation relating
to
Superior Bank and for the FDIC to provide for indemnification on certain matters.").
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the settlement agreement in its corporate capacity, as the receiver and
conservator of Superior, and as the manager of the insurance fund.
In pursuit of its claims against Ernst & Young, the FDIC, in its role
as receiver, faced a debilitating contractual limitation. The agreement
between Ernst & Young and Superior provided that any controversy or
claim had to be settled via arbitration. As the receiver and conservator
of Superior, the FDIC effectively stepped into Superior's shoes, and
The arbitration agreement also
thus was required to arbitrate.
the receiver for SuperiorFDIC-as
the
of
possibility
any
eliminated
to collect punitive damages.
In an effort to avoid the arbitration restriction, the FDIC sued Ernst &
21
Young in its corporate capacity and as manager of the insurance fund.
Acting in its corporate capacity, the FDIC was not bound by the
contractual agreement between Ernst & Young and Superior. The FDIC
argued that the actions of Ernst & Young, specifically, the payments
22
made by the insurance fund to insured depositors, damaged the fund.
The FDIC requested compensatory damages in excess of $500 million
23
In the event that the FDIC
and $1.5 billion in punitive damages.
recovered two billion dollars, the Pritzkers and the Dwormans would
have been entitled to a payment of approximately $500 million under
their settlement agreement with the FDIC.
Ultimately, the FDIC was unsuccessful in its efforts to sue Ernst &
24 The Federal Court for the Northern
Young outside of arbitration.
District of Illinois granted Ernst & Young's motion to dismiss, finding
that the FDIC, in its corporate capacity, lacked standing to sue Ernst &
Young. 2 5 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals modified and affirmed
the decision as modified, holding that the FDIC, in its corporate
26
capacity, could not sue Ernst & Young. In its analysis and application
of Illinois state law as required by federal law in this area, the Seventh
Circuit found that the FDIC could only pursue litigation in its capacity
as receiver. 2 7 Additionally, the court quoted the statutory depositor
21. Plaintiffs Complaint, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 256 F. Supp. 2d 798
(N.D. I1. 2003) (No. 02 C 7914), availableat 2003 WL 22717757.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Ernst & Young, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (finding that the FDIC lacked standing in its
corporate capacity to sue Ernst & Young).
25. Id.
26. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 374 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2004) (reasoning
that the FDIC cannot pursue an action in its corporate capacity that is allocated to its role as
receiver solely for the purpose of avoiding contractual provisions between Ernst & Young and the
failed bank).
27. Id. at 583.
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preference provisions and indicated that the FDIC should pursue any
litigation against Ernst & Young solely in its capacity as receiver.28
RESOLVING THE CLAIMS OF JUSTICE

This part will discuss how the interests of justice and fairness appear
to have been thwarted by the FDIC in its resolution of Superior's
insolvency. The first section will discuss the statutory framework that
should have helped govern the FDIC's decisions in its reaction to the
Superior failure. The second section will discuss the justice and
fairness issues inherent in the FDIC's participation in the Pritzker
Settlement Agreement, as well as its election to pursue Ernst & Young
in its corporate capacity. Finally, the third section will discuss the
complete rejection of the FDIC's decisions by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals and the toll the FDIC's actions, if permitted, might have
taken on Ernst & Young.
A.

The Statutory Framework

To understand the various dilemmas encountered by the FDIC, and to
assess its ultimate decisions, it is important to understand the goals of
liquidating a financial institution. The first and foremost consideration
is generally to maximize the recovery for the failed institution's
creditors. 29 As in a more traditional bankruptcy of a non-financial
institution, the shareholders of a financial institution only recover a
portion of their stock value if any assets remain after paying off all of
the creditors, which realistically never happens in the liquidation of a
financial institution.
Congress, after the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, updated
procedures for the FDIC's liquidation of an insolvent financial
28.

Id.

29.

MICHAEL H.

KRIMMINGER,

DEPOSIT

INSURANCE

AND

BANK

INSOLVENCY

IN A

CHANGING WORLD: SYNERGIES AND CHALLENGES 2 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/
extemal/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/mk.pdf
Recent analyses have identified a number of generally accepted principles for effective
resolution of problem financial institutions. These principles are based on the normally
complementary, but sometimes competing, goals of maximizing the value of the estate
for the benefit of all creditors within an equitable, transparent, and predictable process
while minimizing the cost of the resolution.
Id.; see STiN CLAESSENS,

EXPERIENCES OF RESOLUTIONS OF BANK CRISES 4-9 (1990)

(outlining principles for resolving banking crises), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
finance/assets/images/experience.pdf, cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (Defining
'bankruptcy' as "a statutory procedure by which a debtor [usually insolvent] obtains financial
relief and undergoes a judicially supervised reorganization or liquidation of the debtor's assets
for
the benefit of creditors").
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institution's assets and the distribution of the remaining money to
unsecured creditors and shareholders in its role as receiver of a failed
institution. 30 Under this statutory scheme, the FDIC must first pay the
insured depositors. With the remaining balance of the assets of the
3 1 The
insolvent estate, the FDIC as receiver pays the secured creditors.
FDIC then uses any remaining assets to cover expenses of the
administration of the insolvent estate and to pay any remaining deposit
liabilities. 32 The FDIC can subsequently pay general and senior
subordinated creditors, and stockholders with any remaining
creditors,
33
funds.
B. Justice and the Pritzker Settlement Agreement
As discussed, the FDIC made a calculated decision to favor
shareholders and to abandon its traditional role as receiver when it
entered into the Pritzker settlement and then filed its claims against
Ernst & Young. By electing to sue in its corporate capacity, the FDIC
shirked its duties and responsibilities as receiver, which would have
prohibited its lawsuit against Ernst & Young. In particular, the FDIC
appears to have prioritized the interests of the stockholders over those of
other creditors by agreeing to share any Ernst & Young recovery with
them. Also a cause for alarm, even if the FDIC had successfully
pursued Ernst & Young in its corporate capacity outside of arbitration
proceedings, it may not have had the statutory or regulatory
authorization to share the windfall with any creditors.
Thus, by suing Ernst & Young in its corporate capacity, the FDIC
made the decision to place the bank's stockholders ahead of other
creditors with respect to their entitlement to Superior's assets. This
contravened the spirit of its role as receiver, in which the FDIC was
required to pay creditors before stockholders. 34 Per the Pritzker
settlement, however, the FDIC was contractually obligated to pay the
stockholders twenty-five percent of any settlement or damages incurred
by Ernst & Young. Assuming the FDIC recovered the entire amount
demanded in its complaint, the stockholders could have received up to
$500 million; moreover, the agreement also entitled the FDIC to pay the
shareholders an additional percentage of any civil penalties recovered
30. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (amending the
rules in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) governing the FDIC's conduct while acting as a receiver for
failed institutions within its scope).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(l l)(A) (2000).
34. Id.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

from Ernst & Young.
Regardless of the amount the FDIC could have recovered from Ernst
& Young, the stockholders still would have enjoyed a guaranteed
benefit over the creditors. Even if the FDIC were to collect only $100
million from Ernst & Young (versus the potential $2 billion), this
amount is still $25 million more than the stockholders would have
received in the absence of the settlement agreement. Normally, with a
small recovery, the stockholders receive nothing.
Here, the
stockholders would always receive something, regardless of the
availability of assets for the other creditors.
Assuming the FDIC was permitted by the Seventh Circuit to pursue
Ernst & Young in its corporate capacity, it could be argued that all
creditors would have received some benefit as the FDIC could have
potentially recovered $1.5 billion in punitive damages; something it
could not have done had it gone through arbitration as the receiver.
However, it is unclear whether any of the other creditors actually would
have benefited.
Although the FDIC, acting in its corporate capacity, had agreed to
allocate any excess recoveries over the losses to the Insurance Fund to
the FDIC as receiver, there appears to be no statutory or regulatory
authority authorizing such an action. In fact, because punitive damages
are intended to punish the wrongdoer and restore the plaintiff to his prewrongdoing condition, there would appear to be no reason to pass on
such an award. In fact, other financial institutions that pay premiums to
the Insurance Fund may have challenged such allocation on grounds
that the FDIC was harming the insurance fund by making such a
distribution to the FDIC aoting as receiver.
Even if all depositors, other creditors, and stockholders were paid,
permitting such actions by the FDIC sets a poor precedent as a matter of
public policy. Solely for the purpose of collecting additional funds, the
FDIC avoided the statutory settlement process established by Congress
with respect to shareholders, thereby avoiding its statutory duties and its
responsibilities to other creditors.
In response to this argument, the FDIC stated that there was no
statutory reason why it could not proceed in its corporate capacity.
However, the proper question is not whether the FDIC could go forward
in its corporate capacity due to statutory silence and the prospect of a
larger recovery, but whether, in the interest of fairness and justice, it
should have, given its principal role as receiver of Superior. Even if the
FDIC acted appropriately in the case against Ernst & Young and
properly allocated any excess from the settlement to the FDIC as
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receiver, there is no guarantee that it would act similarly in future
financial institutional failures and subsequent litigation.
C. The Interests of ThirdParties
The Seventh Circuit found that as a matter of statutory interpretation,
"everything points to FDIC-Receiver as the right entity to pursue any
claim against Superior Bank's accountants." 3 5 Despite this formulation,
the FDIC's actions towards Ernst & Young raise questions of justice
and fairness.
When Ernst & Young began rendering services to Superior, the two
parties agreed to resolve any disputes and claims via arbitration and
further agreed that neither party would be liable for punitive damages.
In its role as receiver, the FDIC stepped into the shoes of management
that had entered into the contractual agreement with Ernst & Young.
The only way the FDIC could receive punitive damages was by
litigating in its corporate capacity and discarding its contractual
obligations as receiver of Superior.
If the FDIC had been permitted to sue Ernst & Young in its corporate
capacity, any special contractual provision between management and a
service provider would be at risk of being ignored by the FDIC in
similar situations in the future. The FDIC would likely always elect to
litigate against a failed institution's accountants or other professionals in
its corporate capacity because it could choose not to be considered a
party to the original contract, although its alter ego, the FDIC as
receiver, would. This dual role would enable the FDIC to reap windfall
damages such as those sought in the resolution of Superior's failure.
Permitting the FDIC to pick and choose which contracts to honor by
deciding between its different capacities is neither just nor fair. In this
case, Ernst & Young was placed at risk of losing billions of dollars in
damages and incurred huge legal bills to defend itself unnecessarily
from the FDIC. In addition, the eventual settlement was put off several
years as this unnecessary litigation was resolved.
CONCLUSION

As administrative agencies wield more and more power, they are,
with growing frequency, not only regulating specific areas or industries,
but often weighing questions of justice and fairness as they carry out
these duties. The FDIC's actions and efforts to reconcile its different
roles in the resolution of the Superior insolvency illustrate some of the

35.

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 374 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2004).
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pitfalls and difficulties that an administrative agency can encounter in
the execution of its duties.
The opportunistic actions of the FDIC, illustrated by the highly
questionable settlement agreement and its suit against Ernst & Young in
its corporate capacity, suggest that an administrative agency can lose
sight of what it should do when hundreds of millions of dollars are at
stake. The FDIC's actions sublimated the fairness of the insolvency
resolution process for the creditors of Superior and exposed Ernst &
Young to liabilities well beyond what it had contracted for with
Superior. Given that agencies will play increasingly important roles in
the administration of justice to those they regulate, agencies must
seriously ask what is just and fair for all involved in regulation, instead
of what will simply maximize their power or potential economic
recovery.

